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Abstract
Background: In spite of increasing efforts to enhance patient safety, medication errors in hospitalised patients are
still relatively common, but with potentially severe consequences. This study aimed to assess antineoplastic
medication errors in both affected patients and intercepted cases in terms of frequency, severity for patients, and
costs.
Methods: A 1-year prospective study was conducted in order to identify the medication errors that occurred
during chemotherapy treatment of cancer patients at a French university hospital. The severity and potential
consequences of intercepted errors were independently assessed by two physicians. A cost analysis was performed
using a simulation of potential hospital stays, with estimations based on the costs of diagnosis-related groups.
Results: Among the 6, 607 antineoplastic prescriptions, 341 (5.2%) contained at least one error, corresponding to a
total of 449 medication errors. However, most errors (n = 436) were intercepted before medication was
administered to the patients. Prescription errors represented 91% of errors, followed by pharmaceutical (8%) and
administration errors (1%). According to an independent estimation, 13.4% of avoided errors would have resulted
in temporary injury and 2.6% in permanent damage, while 2.6% would have compromised the vital prognosis of
the patient, with four to eight deaths thus being avoided. Overall, 13 medication errors reached the patient
without causing damage, although two patients required enhanced monitoring. If the intercepted errors had not
been discovered, they would have resulted in 216 additional days of hospitalisation and cost an estimated annual
total of 92, 907€, comprising 69, 248€ (74%) in hospital stays and 23, 658€ (26%) in additional drugs.
Conclusion: Our findings point to the very small number of chemotherapy errors that actually reach patients,
although problems in the chemotherapy ordering process are frequent, with the potential for being dangerous
and costly.
Background
The report, “To Err is Human”, from the Institute of
Medicine estimated that between 44, 000 and 98, 000
patients die each year in the USA as a result of medical
errors [1]. Although certain adverse events are unavoid-
able, many are preventable, with medication errors
being a major cause of such accidents [2]. Medication
errors may occur anytime and at any stage during the
medication use process, from the prescription of the
drug to its preparation, dispensing, and final administra-
tion to the patient. Moreover, the medication process
involves the whole medical team, involving physicians,
pharmacists, and nurses [3].
Medication errors with antineoplastic drugs may be
catastrophic due to the drugs’ high toxicity and small
therapeutic index in addition to the health status of can-
cer patients. A study revealed that antineoplastic agents
were the second most common cause of fatal medica-
tion errors [4]. While overdosage is likely to result in
permanent damage to the patient, underdosage may
compromise the success of therapy. Although several
individual case reports focused on medication errors
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the issue is still needed.
At present, the prevention of antineoplastic medica-
tion errors is a priority in hospitals [13], with numerous
recommendations being published in order to help
decrease the likelihood of errors [14-16]. The emerging
patient safety movement advocated a shift from the his-
torical culture of blame and shame to a culture of trans-
parency in order to encourage health care workers to
report their errors [17]. Consequently, national reporting
systems for medication errors were established, but as
these were not mandatory, the published errors tended
to reflect only a small proportion of the actual errors
committed. Little data is available on the potential
severity and clinical consequences of antineoplastic
medication errors in terms of the need for enhanced
patient monitoring, new or prolonged hospitalisation,
and initiation of new treatments. Medication errors are
costly to patients, their families, and employers, as well
as to hospitals, health-care providers, and insurance
companies, although there are few reliable estimates of
their costs [18,19].
In order to reduce medication errors, we must
increase our awareness about their occurrence and con-
sequences. Thus, we conducted a 1-year prospective
study aimed at detecting antineoplastic medication
errors in both affected patients and intercepted cases in
terms of frequency, severity for patients, and economic
impact on the French Public Health Insurance.
Methods
Setting
The study was conducted in a 1200-bed teaching hospi-
tal in France. During the 1-year study, the centralised
cytotoxic preparation unit set up approximately 21, 000
doses of antineoplastic agents for patients in the haema-
tology, medical oncology, and pneumology wards, as
well as other units involved in the care of cancer
patients. Wards included both daycare and inpatient
units. The age, experience, and status of prescribers var-
ied, ranging from residents to senior attending physi-
cians. The medical data system was not fully
computerised as prescriptions were handwritten on
standardised forms, entered into a local database, and
then transferred to the pharmaceutical unit in order to
be verified by pharmacists. In addition, all forms were
validated by senior physicians and pharmacists. Physi-
cians had to approve the prescription, providing a
signed “green light” for both cytotoxic drug preparation
and administration, indicating that they thought patients
were able to receive the treatment according to their
daily clinical and biological status (blood count, etc.).
Pharmacists had to analyse prescriptions by verifying
patient data (identity, age, weight, and height) as well as
the antineoplastic regimen to be used, and then entering
the data into dedicated pharmacy software (Asclepios
®).
In addition, pharmacists confirmed any dose adjustment
or deviation from the validated antineoplastic regimen.
The software calculated other data, namely body surface
area, anticancer drug dose, date and time of prescrip-
tion, as well as day and duration of drug delivery to the
patient. Fabrication forms that permitted the prepara-
tion of anticancer drugs by pharmacy technicians were
also edited, including a double check at each step of the
fabrication process. Prior to dispensing prescriptions to
medical wards, for each preparation, pharmacists carried
out a qualitative control by verifying the patient’sn a m e ,
drug dose, and type and volume of dilution fluid in
addition to a semi-quantitative control by comparing
the ordered dose and number of vials used.
Detection of medication errors
Our prospective study undertaken between June 2006
and May 2007 aimed to collect all antineoplastic medi-
cation errors, concerning both unintercepted mistakes
that affected patients and intercepted mistakes. Medica-
tion errors were defined as a failure in the treatment
process, which led to or had the potential to lead to the
patient being harmed. The different types of medication
errors are defined in Table 1. During routine practice,
errors were able to be detected and intercepted at every
step of the chemotherapy process, with all health profes-
sionals being involved in error detection. Prescription
errors were detected by pharmacists using systematic
pharmaceutical analysis of all prescribed antineoplastic
regimens. Preparation errors were detected during the
preparation by the double checked of the fabrication
process and by self-reported by pharmacy technicians,
or at the time of final pharmaceutical control. Finally,
administration errors were reported on a voluntary basis
by nurses or physicians.
Analysis of potential clinical consequences
For each intercepted medication error, the potential
severity was evaluated according to the Medication
Error Index for categorising such errors, ranging in
severity from “no patient harm” to “potential patient
death” [3]. A literature review on chemotherapy medica-
tion errors and their consequences was performed using
Pubmed database, with the search keywords being “anti-
neoplastic agents and overdoses” and “antineoplastic
agents and medication errors”. An analysis of case
reports allowed us to design a worksheet aimed to assess
the potential clinical consequences arising from antican-
cer medication errors in terms of the need for enhanced
patient monitoring, hospitalisation (number and dura-
tion of hospital stays), or initiation of new treatments
(Table 2). The potential severity and consequences of
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dently by two physicians specialised in haematology,
oncology, and pneumology according to the case. Based
on our analysis of actual prescription charts and error
descriptions, the assessment of the potential damage of
each error took into account individual patient history
and pharmacological data regarding the risk of adverse
events. Two pharmacists analysed the remaining inter-
cepted medication errors that did not have any impact
on patients.
Cost simulations
Cost was defined as the hospital costs incurred by the
French public health insurance system in order to treat
Table 1 Classification of medication errors
Type of medication errors Definition
Prescription errors
Error linked to the choice of
antineoplastic regimen
Difference of antineoplastic regimen compared to the previous cycle or the multidisciplinary medical
decision
Dose error Under- or overdosage of more than 5% of antineoplastic drugs (calculation mistake or omission of dose
reduction when dosage adjustment was required)
Incomplete prescription Missing data on the prescription, such as patient identity, anthropometric or biological data, drug dose,
prescriber’s signature, and date of administration
Cancellation of medical approval Misinterpretation of the clinical status of the patient, who was not able to receive chemotherapy
Pharmaceutical errors Errors in pharmaceutical analysis (i.e., pharmacist-generated mistakes or failure to detect prescription errors),
data entry in the pharmaceutical software, preparation, storage, or dispensing errors
Drug administration errors Any discrepancy between the physicians’ chemotherapy orders and drug delivery to the patient, such as
timing errors, omission, unordered drug, wrong route, wrong patient, deteriorated drug, and technical error
in administration (e.g., wrong infusion flow rate)
Table 2 Worksheet used to assess the potential clinical consequences due to anticancer medication errors
Error number:
Check the appropriate boxes
Physician assessment
number: 1 or 2
Potential severity according to the Medication Error Index (3)
No consequences for the patient
An error avoided that would not cause patient harm
An error avoided that would require monitoring to confirm that it did not result in
patient harm
Temporary damage Potential clinical
consequences
Potential hospitalisation and
treatment*
An error avoided that could have contributed to temporary harm to the patient,
requiring intervention
Acute renal failure Hospitalisation
Cardiac toxicity Prolongation of the initial
hospitalisation
Skin toxicity New hospitalisation
An error avoided that could have contributed to temporary harm to the patient,
requiring initial or prolonged hospitalisation
Neutropenia Type of ward
Thrombopenia Standard hospitalisation unit
Anemia Day-care unit
Febrile neutropenia Intensive care unit
Neurotoxicity Number of additional days of
hospitalisation
Permanent damage Hepatic cytolysis Treatments
An error avoided that could have contributed to permanent patient harm Hepatic cholestasis Platelet transfusions
Compromised vital prognosis Diarrhea Erythrocyte transfusions
An error avoided that could have required intervention necessary to sustain life Vomiting Granulocyte Colony Stimulating
Factor
Patient death Other: Parenteral nutrition
Other:
An error avoided that could have contributed to the patient’s death
* Only drugs funded in addition to the diagnosis-related groups costs
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ory, these resources would not have been required had
there been no error. Three scenarios were thus possible:
1- The chemotherapy medication error would have
been without clinical consequences for the patient, and
without economic consequences for the hospital.
2- The chemotherapy medication error would have
resulted in clinical consequences for the patient, requir-
ing out-of-hospital treatment, but without economic
consequences for the hospital (for example, a minor
overdosage of vincristin causing peripheral neurotoxici-
ties, which might be treated at home using analgesics).
3- The chemotherapy medication error would have
resulted in clinical consequences for the patient, requiring
hospitalisation and treatment. In this case, hospital stays
depending on potential consequences of medication errors
as estimated by physicians were simulated using GHIM
software (Hospital and medical information management)
based on the diagnosis-related groups of the French medi-
cal hospital information system. These simulations were
conducted according to established guidelines [20]. The
costs of expensive drugs, which were funded by the French
public health insurance system, in addition to costs from
diagnosis-related groups were taken into account [21].
Statistical analysis
For the descriptive analysis of medication errors, the
unit of analysis was the number of errors, with a pre-
scribing medication order containing one or more drugs
considered to correspond to one or more medication
errors. The unit of analysis for assessing severity and
costs was the prescribing medication order.
Univariate analysis was conducted using the Chi-
squared test in order to compare the number of medica-
tion errors in relation to the month of the year or medi-
cal ward. The reliability of physicians’ judgments was
calculated using Kappa statistics [22], with all statistical
analyses being performed using SPSS
®.
Results
Chemotherapy medication errors: incidence and type
During the 12-month study period, the pharmacy unit
received 6, 607 prescriptions corresponding to 22, 138
distinct anticancer drugs. In total, 449 medication errors
were detected throughout the medication use process,
involving 341 prescriptions (Table 3). The overall medi-
cation error rate was 5.2%. Among the 449 medication
errors, 436 were intercepted by physicians, pharmacists,
or nurses prior to administration, while 13 reached the
patients (2.9% of all errors). Medication errors were
made by residents (50.7%), residents with approval by a
senior oncologist (19%), and senior physicians (30.3%).
Approximately 91% (408/449 errors) of medication
errors concerned inadequate prescriptions, with 405
being intercepted. Overall, 31 errors were linked to the
choice of antineoplastic regimen (7.6%). In 196 cases,
prescriptions were incomplete with data missing from
the prescription (48%), while in 167 cases, erroneous
medication doses were recorded (40.9%). The most
common causal drug was carboplatin, which was
involved in 35 cases or 21% of dose errors, despite cor-
responding to only 3% of anticancer drugs prescribed at
our institution. The most prescribed drug, 5-fluoroura-
cil, was involved in 12% of all prescriptions and repre-
sented 11% of dose errors (19 cases), while oxaliplatin
represented only 2% of prescriptions, but was the third
most common drug involved in dose errors (8% or 13
cases) (Table 4). In 14 cases (3.4%), the physician
requested the drug preparation process to be stopped in
order to further analyse the patient’s status despite pre-
viously giving medical approval.
Overall, 36 pharmaceutical errors occurred, involving
0.16% (36/22, 138) of all anticancer drugs prepared, with
30 errors being intercepted. Pharmaceutical errors were
classified as resulting from pharmaceutical analysis (4),
data entry into the pharmaceutical software (4), prepara-
tion (26), storage (1), or dispensing errors (1).
Five errors of drug administration were reported by
nurses or physicians, or 0.02% (5/22, 138) of all antican-
cer drugs given to patients, with only one error being
intercepted just prior to administration.
A statistically significant relationship was found
between the rate of medication errors and month of the
year (p = 0.001). May and January were the months
most at risk of errors, while October and November
were the least (Figure 1). When taking into account
medical wards, error rates were significantly lower in
haematology and medical oncology (p = 0.001, Table 3).
Medication errors: severity
In total, 341 erroneous prescriptions were reported, with
329 being intercepted. For 191 of the erroneous pre-
scriptions considered to be without impact, the potential
severity was assessed by the pharmaceutical team. The
remaining 138 cases of intercepted prescriptions (41.9%
of erroneous protocols) were analysed by two indepen-
dent physicians from the haematology, oncology includ-
ing gastroenterology and radiotherapy, and pneumology
wards (Table 5). The concordance of medical judgement
was found to vary depending on the medical speciality,
being good in haematology (k = 0.75, 53 prescriptions),
but moderate in oncology (k = 0.51, 48 prescriptions)
and pneumology (k = 0.42, 37 prescriptions). Overall,
81.4% of intercepted medication errors would have had
no impact for the patients. However, 13.4% of errors
would have resulted in temporary damage and 2.6% in
permanent injury, while 2.6% would have compromised
the vital prognosis of the patient. The potential injuries
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of haematological toxicity, 27 of neurotoxicity, six of
hepatic cytolysis, nine of renal failure, three of skin toxi-
city, and two of cardiac toxicity being avoided. If not
intercepted, between four and eight medication errors
would have resulted in the patient’sd e a t h .T h e s e
avoided incidents related to eight overdosages and one
wrong route of administration. The drugs involved in
the averted fatal overdosages were vinblastine (592.5 mg
prescribed instead of 9.48 mg), vinorelbine (300 mg
instead of 30 mg), cisplatin (1, 344 mg instead of 134
mg, a daily dose of 92 mg instead of 34 mg for 5 succes-
sive days), doxorubicin (415 mg instead of 41.5 mg), and
docetaxel (918 mg instead of 85.5 mg). In addition, two
cases of ten-fold dose errors were intercepted with the
prescription of 1, 830 mg of etoposide instead of 183
mg and 1, 830 mg of cisplatin instead of 183 mg. The
wrong administration route error concerned the erro-
neous intrathecal administration of intravenous vincris-
tine, which was intercepted just in time in the medical
ward.
A total of 13 medication errors reached patients. One
of these errors required enhanced monitoring of a dia-
betic patient, after administering anticancer preparations
with a glucose solvent. Another error impacted anticoa-
gulant treatment without any injury to the patient. The
remaining errors had no consequences for the patients
involved.
Cost evaluation
During the 12-month period, the potential cost of the
intercepted medication errors to the French health
insurance system was estimated at 92, 907€,w i t h6 9 ,
248€ (74%) attributed to hospitalisation and 23, 658€
(26%) to the cost of drugs in addition to the diagnosis-
related groups (Table 6). Furthermore, if not inter-
cepted, the medication errors described above would
have led to 216 additional hospital days. The results
from the evaluation by two physicians according to spe-
ciality are provided in Table 6, reflecting the divergence
in physicians’ medical appreciation of medication errors
and their clinical consequences.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that medication errors
occurred frequently at our hospital, at a rate of 5.2%,
which is comparable to the rates reported in published
literature, ranging from 0.4% to 31.9% [23-25]. The
Table 3 Descriptive analysis of frequency and type of chemotherapy medication errors over 1 year
Number of errors
Type of chemotherapy medication errors Haematology Medical
Oncology
Pneumology Others
specialities
1
Pharmacy Total
Prescription error
Erroneous choice of antineoplastic regimen 20 5 3 3 - 31
Data missing on the prescription 128 28 25 15 - 196
Wrong dose
< 10% 13 11 11 4 - 39
[10-50%[ 26 18 28 15 - 87
[50-100%] 15 9 2 4 - 30
> 100% 2 4 3 2 - 11
Withdrawal of medical approval 5 3 5 1 - 14
Total (1) 209 78 77 44 - 408
Pharmaceutical error
Pharmaceutical analysis - - - - 4 4
Data entry - - - - 4 4
Fabrication - - - - 26 26
Storage - - - - 1 1
Dispensation - - - - 1 1
Total (2) - - - - 36 36
Drug administration error
Total (3) 3 - - 2 - 5
Total (1+2+3) 212 78 77 46 36 449
Number of antineoplastic agents prepared by
pharmacy
11866 5270 2743 2259 22138 -
Percentage of medication errors 1.79 1.48 2.81 2.04 0.16 -
1Others specialities included gastroenterology (23 medication errors) and radiotherapy (23 medication errors)
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cation errors and month of the year is still unclear, as it
cannot be accounted by the biannual rotation of residents
occurring in May and November. Furthermore, error
rates were lower in the haematology and medical oncol-
ogy wards (p = 0.001), where the most antineoplastic
chemotherapy was prescribed, suggesting that oncologi-
cal experience was incremental in reducing the error risk.
Indeed, the haematology and medical oncology wards are
specialised in cancer treatment, while the pneumology
and gastroenterology wards usually treat other diseases.
In addition, in the haematology and medical oncology
wards, residents and physicians generally attend a specific
training program, including more detailed practical and
theoretical approaches dedicated to cancer chemotherapy
treatments. Incomplete prescriptions were found to be
frequent and time-consuming for physicians and phar-
macists, constituting a delaying factor in the setting up of
therapy. Medication dose errors represented the second
most common type of error in terms of frequency, with
the dose difference being > 50% higher than the theoreti-
cal dose in 24.6% of cases (n = 41). These dose errors are
considered to be the most dangerous for the patient. In
our study, very few prescription medication errors actu-
ally reached the patient, due to the dedicated quality con-
trol system. Most prescription errors could possibly have
been avoided by using a computerised chemotherapy
prescribing system [26], but such a system is not available
in all French hospitals. However, more recent publica-
tions highlighted the role played by computerised sys-
tems in the occurrence of other types of errors,
demonstrating computers to be only a part of the
ongoing process aimed to improve patient safety [27-29].
Only five administration errors (0.02%) were detected,
which was lower than the rate reported in literature
[30,31]. The pharmaceutical error rate (0.16%) appeared to
Table 4 Descriptive analysis of antineoplastic dose errors
Underdosage Overdosage
Percentage of error
1 < 10 [10-50[ [50-100] > 100 < 10 [10-50[ [50-100] > 100 Total Frequency of drug prescriptions (%)
Bevacizumab - - 2 - 1 - - - 3 0.65
Bleomycin - - - - - 3 - - 3 3.1
Bortezomib 1 - - - - 3 1 - 5 3.36
Carboplatin 4 9 1 - 5 14 2 - 35 2.66
Cetuximab - - - - - - 2 - 2 0.99
Cisplatin - - - - - 2 1 3 6 5.22
Cyclophosphamide 1 2 1 - 1 2 1 - 8 6.31
Cytarabine - 1 - - - - - - 1 3.23
Dacarbazine - - - - - 1 - - 1 1.71
Docetaxel - - - - - 2 - 1 3 2.69
Doxorubicin - - 1 - 2 - - 1 4 8.04
Drug in clinical trial - - 1 - - 1 - - 2 0.5
Liposomal doxorubicin - - - - - 2 - - 2 0.31
Epirubicin - - 1 - - - - - 1 0.6
Etoposide 1 1 - - 1 1 - 1 5 7.82
Fluorouracil 4 - 1 - 4 9 1 - 19 12.1
Gemcitabine - 1 - - - 5 3 1 10 4.91
Ifosfamide - 2 2 - 2 2 - - 8 2.67
Irinotecan 1 - - - 1 1 - 1 4 2.57
Methotrexate - - 1 - - 1 - - 2 1.6
Oxaliplatin 1 2 - - 1 7 1 1 13 2.15
Paclitaxel 1 - - - - 3 - - 4 1.63
Raltitrexed - - - - - - 1 - 1 0.1
Rituximab - 2 - - 4 - 1 - 7 8.21
Trastuzumab - 1 1 - - - - - 2 1.78
Vinblastine - - - - 1 1 - 1 3 2.01
Vincristine - - - - 1 4 3 - 8 5.18
Vindesine - - - - 1 - - - 1 0.75
Vinorelbine - - - - - 2 1 1 4 2.12
Total 14 21 12 - 25 66 18 11 167
1 Percentage of error = (theoretical dose - incorrect dose)/theoretical dose *100
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Page 6 of 10Figure 1 Percentages of medication errors by month of the year.
Table 5 Severity distribution of intercepted medication errors
Number of protocols with at least one error
Potential severity according to the Medication Error Index (3) Haematology Oncology
1
Pneumology Pharmacy Total
2 (% of
erroneous
prescription)
abc d efg
No consequences for the patient
An error avoided that would not cause patient harm 20 21 18 19 14 14 157 210
An error avoided that would require monitoring to confirm that it
did not result in patient harm
3 10 4 8 7 16 34 58
Total 268 (81.4%)
Temporary damage
An error avoided that could have contributed to temporary harm to
the patient, requiring intervention
609 8 940 1 8
An error avoided that could have contributed to temporary harm to
the patient, requiring initial or prolonged hospitalisation
14 12 13 6 6 1 0 26
Total 44 (13.4%)
Permanent damage
An error avoided that could have contributed to permanent patient
harm
771 2 000 8.5 (2.6%)
Compromised vital prognosis
An error avoided that could have required intervention necessary to
sustain life
002 2 100 2.5 (0.8%)
Patient death
An error avoided that could have contributed to the patient’s death 3 3 1 3 0 2 0 6 (1.8%)
Total 53 53 48 48 37 37 191 329 (100%)
1 including gastroenterology and radiotherapy
2 Total = (a+b)/2 + (c+d)/2 + (e+f)/2 +g
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Page 7 of 10Table 6 Assessment of the potential cost of medication errors
Haematology Oncology
1 Pneumology
a b c d e f Total
2
Cost linked to new potential hospitalisation (€ 2008) 7, 908.5 5, 354.2 3, 614.3 844.9 0 0 8, 861
Cost linked to potential prolongation of hospitalisation (€ 2008) 26, 720.9 29, 213.8 24, 039.5 21, 232.3 13, 259.6 6, 309.1 60, 387.6
Cost linked to drugs paid for in addition to the diagnosis-related groups (€ 2008) 8, 313.9 8, 383.9 12, 378.8 12, 378.8 2, 930.9 2, 930.9 23, 658.6
Total (€ 2008) 42, 943.3 42, 951.9 40, 032.6 34, 456 16, 190.5 9, 240 92, 907.2
1 including gastroenterology and radiotherapy
2 Total = (a+b)/2 + (c+d)/2 + (e+f)/2
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0be very low compared with a similar study focused on the
preparation process (3.6% of pharmaceutical errors) [32]
and also lower than another study using a totally compu-
terised chemotherapy prescribing system (0.45%) [33]. Bib-
liographic data suggests that there was significant under-
reporting of administration and pharmaceutical errors in
our study, which may be explained by a number of factors,
such as the fear of blame as well as the bureaucratic and
time-consuming process for reporting incidents.
Our findings provide more precise information than
previously available on the potential severity and clinical
consequences of medication errors in terms of required
monitoring, hospitalisation, and treatment. In our study, if
medication errors had not been intercepted prior to
administration, 13.4% would have caused temporary
damage and 2.6% permanent injury, while 2.6% would
have compromised the vital prognosis of the patient. The
potential for fatal accidents still exists, with four to eight
deaths being avoided by means of the collaborative medi-
cal and pharmaceutical teams. The dramatic consequences
of antineoplastic medication errors are crucial given the
nature of anticancer drug toxicity, the use of antineoplas-
tics drugs in complex multiple-drug regimens, and the
overall health status of cancer patients. In our study, the
potential consequences of medication errors could not be
established, but instead they were estimated by physicians,
which was a difficult exercise as illustrated by the kappa
score. Indeed, some toxicities, such as neurotoxicities,
along with their impact on patient care are difficult to pre-
dict. Furthermore, the evaluations were arbitrary, as they
did not take into account the measures adopted in case of
immediate discovery of the medication errors.
To our knowledge, no studies to date have estimated the
potential costs of antineoplastic medication errors. It was
estimated that close to 100, 000€ was saved in addition to
216 additional days of hospitalisation. Comparisons with
other cost analysis studies are difficult, due to the differing
methodologies, choices, and specific features of the health
systems in various countries. In addition, our study was
limited to antineoplastic chemotherapy, which in turn
reduces its comparability, and our cost analysis took only
into account hospital and medication costs arising for the
French health insurance system. However, the cost of
medication errors for the society as a whole is much
higher, when considering the direct non-medical costs,
such as patient transportation, home care, and housing fit-
ting if necessary, and the indirect costs, like hiring home
help, as well as the intangible costs, such as those relating
to pain and suffering. In addition, it should be noted that
the costs involved in the time spent by physicians, phar-
macists, and nurses on the quality control system aimed at
intercepting medication errors was not evaluated in our
study, although an economic assessment of this issue
appears warranted.
Conclusion
This study demonstrated that very few medication
errors actually reached patients, although defects in the
chemotherapy ordering process were frequent, with the
potential to be dangerous and costly. Oncology was an
area of particular risk due to the severity of medical
consequences for the patient, as shown by the six poten-
tial deaths that were avoided. The potential costs related
to medication errors were not negligible, being nearly
100, 000€ over a 1-year time period, although this figure
did not include indirect outpatient medical and other
non-medical related costs. The dedicated quality control
system was able to intercept most of the medication
errors prior to administration. Such a chemotherapy
control system, however, requires close cooperation
between physicians, pharmacists, and nurses.
Our study highlighted the need for developing sys-
tematic preventive actions in order to reduce medication
errors and improve quality of care. Electronic prescrib-
ing of antineoplastic chemotherapy appears to be the
next step in the ongoing process of improving safety.
Other complementary approaches, such as medication
error reviews that allow for a collective and multidisci-
plinary error analysis, should also be implemented.
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